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Seneca against Plato: Letters 58 and 65 
 
George Boys-Stones 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is a disconcerting fact about our evidence for post-Hellenistic Stoicism that its adherents 
seem to put up very little fight in response to the rise of Platonism at that period. This is 
disconcerting because Platonists, for their part, consistently and aggressively defined their 
philosophy in opposition to the Hellenistic schools, including the Hellenistic Stoa, whose 
work they liked to depict as the product of a degenerate regression from the insights of Plato. 
Yet, far from responding in kind, or even defending themselves, it has often seemed that the 
Stoics of this later era, if they offered any response at all, rather conceded ground to the 
Platonists: that they sought ‘rapprochement’, maybe even a marriage of sorts; at least an open 
conversation.1 
 I have argued elsewhere (Boys-Stones 2009) that this impression is false. The 
principal reason why it is not obvious to us that Stoics of the early centuries AD responded 
critically to the Platonist revival may be the simple fact that their response did not involve the 
development of new and eye-catching lines of argument. Post-Hellenistic Platonists had to 
construct a position against the Stoics from scratch; but as far as the Stoics were concerned, 
what was wrong with Platonism was what their ancestors had argued was wrong with Plato in 
the first place – imprimis, the belief in non-material causes. No wonder, then, that Platonist 
polemic is more visible to us. Platonists are hard at work defining their relevance in 
contemporary philosophical debate; the Stoics, on the other hand, are best served by acting as 
if the battle had been won 300 hundred years and more earlier. 
 It may be as a consequence of this that Plato himself is not given the warm welcome 
among post-Hellenistic Stoics that he received in the Hellenistic school. In fending off 
Platonists, the Stoics are brought to remember their antipathy to Plato. At least, this is what I 
shall argue in this chapter. If one takes the Stoic need to defend themselves against the threat 
of the new Platonism as part of the context for their writing, then their frequent interactions 
with Plato, the allusions and quotations, agreements and borrowings which lead scholars to 
see a tendency to eclecticism in the Roman Stoa, may turn out to be evidence of a very much 
less accommodating move. In particular, I should like to show how this is true of two of 
Seneca’s letters – Letters 58 and 65. These letters, dealing as they do with Platonic notions of 
being and causality, have been singled out as especially important indices of how far Stoics 
felt able to go in opening a dialogue with Platonism. But they rather seem to me to be – and 
to need to be – highly polemical: a bullish response to the challenge posed to Stoicism by the 
new Platonist movement; and ultimately a rejection of Plato too.2 
 
 
                                                 
1
 E.g. (to mention only works with a focus on Seneca): Sedley 2005: 131-2 (‘rapprochement’); Donini 1979 
(esp. 159: partial acceptance) (cf. Natali 1992 and 1994); Inwood 2007a (esp. 110: ‘conversation’). 
2
 The most important recent work on these letters includes Sedley 2005, and Inwood 2007a and 2007b. Earlier 
discussions tend to focus on the question of Seneca’s sources (a question about which I shall have nothing at all 
to say). See in particular Bickel 1960 (with useful pointers to previous discussions) (Bickel sees Posidonius 
behind 58, and Aristotelian commentators behind 65); Whittaker 1975 (Eudorus behind 58); Dillon 1977: 136-8 
(Arius Didymus behind 58, Eudorus or Antiochus behind 65); Donini 1979: 275-95 (Antiochus behind both); 
Setaioli 1985 (an unknown commentary on the Timaeus behind both); Gersh 1986: 194-5 (an early Platonist 
handbook behind both); Rist 1989: 2010-11 (Arius Didymus behind both); Chaumartin 1993 (Platonist 
commentators of an Aristotelian bent behind 65).  
  
2. Approaching Letters 58 and 65  
 
The pro-Platonic reading of Seneca has, it must be said, a number of things going for it. 
Seneca evidently is pro-Plato, at least in the sense of holding Plato in high regard as a major 
figure in the history of philosophy.3 He uses Plato’s dualistic language to lead his audience 
away from fixation on the body and towards an appropriate respect for the soul and the 
deeper mysteries of nature (not least in Letters 58 and 65); on one occasion, he actually 
defends Plato against the attack of a fellow-Stoic (Letter 94.38). When he turns in Letter 58 
to what seems to be a fusion of Platonic ontology with principles of Stoic classification, it is 
only natural to take this very seriously indeed. 
 The problem is that what appears to be going on in Letter 58 is of a different order of 
significance to Seneca’s other Platonic engagements. When Seneca emphasises the 
importance of soul over body, he does so without ever abandoning the view that only the 
material exists, and that the soul is ultimately mortal.4 The occasion on which he defends 
Plato (94.38) sees Seneca (ironically) in disagreement with one of the most famously Platonic 
of all the Stoics, and over a matter of marginal philosophical importance.5 If reconciliation is 
really what is on offer in Letter 58, on the other hand, then it puts the very basis for a 
distinction between Stoicism and Platonism at risk. If Seneca is countenancing the existence 
of (non-material) forms and a transcendent god, then he is doing something much more 
radical than he does elsewhere: something which might arguably count as giving up on 
Stoicism altogether. 
 There is another problem with the ‘reconciliatory’ reading of Letter 58, which is how 
it is to be squared with the more overtly hostile line taken in Letter 65. Letter 65 is relevant 
here, not just because it is the one other letter that deals explicitly with Platonic doctrine, but 
also because the doctrine it deals with is closely related to that in 58. In 65, Seneca surveys 
Platonic casual theory, comparing it unfavourably with that of the Stoics. But Platonic causal 
theory is, of course, closely bound up with Platonic ontology, since the primary causes for a 
Platonist are precisely the non-material ones (forms and god). At the very least, we can say 
that if Plato’s causal theory does not survive Letter 65, Seneca might be expected to find the 
Platonic ontology of 58 otiose after all. 
 The response to this latter objection seems to be that the priority of Letter 58 in the 
sequence means that it should be the one to set the tone. The idea would be that it is perverse 
to read backwards from 65 to a negative interpretation of 58. It is more natural to assume that 
the basically friendly attitude towards Plato established the earlier letter is meant to ensure 
that the reader is not misled by the rough-and-tumble of the debate over details in Letter 65 
into thinking that Seneca really ends up in fundamental disagreement with Plato. 
 Something along these lines seems to be an important part of the groundwork for the 
pro-Platonic reading of these letters, and so of Seneca’s philosophy as a whole. And it is an 
approach that works well enough so long as one only has Letters 58 and 65 in view. The 
trouble is that it works very much less well if one considers the broader published context of 
these letters: the place they occupy in the collection of letters as a whole.6 It is increasingly 
well recognised that the collection has a unified character and purpose that transcends and 
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 At Letter 108.38, Plato is listed as one of the original sources for the philosophical arguments trotted out by 
derivative scholars, alongside Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius (et al., clearly, although the text becomes 
uncertain at that point). 
4
 This language above all else has led to a view that Seneca is inclined towards a Platonic ‘dualism’; but see 
now the perspicuous (and definitive) assessment of Reydams-Schils 2010. 
5
 The Stoic is Posidonius; the question, whether laws should be written with a preamble. (Posidonius argues that 
they should not.) See n.63 of Long’s chapter. 
6
 Cf. remarks at Inwood 2007b: 150-2 (though Inwood himself does little more than bring Letter 66 into play as 
well). 
  
frames the individual letters which comprise it. In particular, the collection is carefully and 
artfully structured to trace and respond to the developing pedagogical needs of its addressee, 
Lucilius.7 But this is crucial for the reader of these letters. Judgements on their interpretation 
need to take into account the point that Lucilius has reached on his journey towards 
philosophical maturity; and judgements about developments in emphasis or thought between 
different letters need to take into account the progress that Lucilius is supposed to have made 
between those letters. In this light, it is far from absurd to think that the tone of subsequent 
letters ought to colour our view of letters earlier in the series. On the whole, one can assume 
that earlier letters are meant to speak to a philosophically more naive audience: the ‘official’ 
position might well be the one that Seneca feels able to set out only after suitable preparation, 
later on.8 This, I suggest, is precisely what is happening with Letters 58 and 65. In order to 
see how, though, we need to start right back at the beginning of the corpus. 
 
 
3. The Story So Far 
 
The apparent hardening of Seneca’s attitude towards Platonism between 58 and 65 has, I 
think, a parallel in a much more famous development that occurs earlier on in the corpus: that 
in Seneca’s attitude towards Epicurus.9 For Epicurus features prominently in the first three 
books: in fully 23 of the letters they comprise (Letters 1-29, the exceptions being Letters 1, 3, 
4, 5, 10 and 15), Epicurus is mentioned by name, and is often the source for a closing maxim. 
Yet he is scarcely so much as mentioned thereafter.10 There is no question that this is because 
Seneca changed his own mind about Epicureanism as the Letters progressed. He refers to 
Epicureanism as the ‘enemy camp’ even as he borrows from it early on (2.5: he goes there 
non tamquam transfuga sed tamquam explorator). So why does he appeal to Epicurus in the 
early letters, when he does not do so later on? The answer lies with Lucilius. Seneca begins 
his letters as protreptic addressed to a man who is too wrapped up in the affairs of the world 
to have time for philosophy. What he needs to do is to present philosophy as something both 
accessible and appealing. Epicureanism can easily be made to seem both.11 By judicious 
appropriation of Epicurean language and thought, Seneca is able to lay emphasis on those 
aspects of philosophy in general which will make it seem attractive to Lucilius: especially its 
promise of withdrawal and emancipation (already 1.1, but see esp. Letter 19) – even, it is 
hinted, of otium (19.8). In doing this, Seneca, is conceding nothing to the truth of 
Epicureanism. He is simply using Epicurus as a way into philosophical study that is likely to 
appeal to someone like Lucilius who, as yet, does not know too much about it.12 
 By Letter 27 (towards the end of Book 3), Lucilius must have been well and truly 
hooked, because at this point Seneca drops the pretence that philosophy is a relaxing activity. 
                                                 
7
 See e.g. Wilson 2001: 184-6; Henderson 2004; Griffin 2007. 
8
 Cf. Wilson 2001: 182 on the ‘vehemence with which Seneca repudiates the approach he previously advocated’ 
in the use of maxims as a pedagogical tool. 
9
 Reydams-Schils compares Seneca’s pedagogical use of Plato to his use of Epicurean material (2010: 214); cf. 
Inwood; 2007a: 110. 
10
 To be precise, he is named, or the word Epicureus is used, in 13 further letters (viz. 33, 46, 48, 52, 66, 68, 72, 
79, 81, 85, 89, 92, and 97) – and not at all in the last four books that we have (Books 17-20 = Letters  101-24). 
11
 The idea that Epicureanism was a philosophy for ‘beginners’ is well established in ancient polemic: see for 
example Cicero, de finibus 3.2-3; Academica 1.4-7. 
12
 Though Griffin (2007: 91) may also be right to suggest that Lucilius was interested in Epicurus to begin with. 
(I certainly agree, by the  way, with Griffin’s insistence that the letters represent a fictional exchange between 
Seneca and a fictionalised version of the historical Lucilius. In this paper, nothing I say about Lucilius should be 
taken as a historical claim about his real-life counterpart.) A different sort of approach to Seneca’s appeal to 
Epicurus early on is suggested by Inwood (2007c, 146), who notes that it establishes a literary precedent for 
Seneca’s letters in those famously written by Epicurus. 
  
On the contrary, he says, it turns out to be what real work is: Letter 27, then, is about the 
difficulty of virtue (2: dimitte istas voluptates turbidas! 4: multum restat operis &c.). It is no 
coincidence that it is very shortly thereafter (from the beginning of Book 4) that references to 
Epicurus start to dry up. And it is not just Epicureanism that falls away, but the ‘easy’ way of 
doing philosophy that was tacitly associated with it. In particular, Seneca now drops the use 
of maxims altogether: as he explains in Letter 33, it is time for Lucilius to engage seriously 
with serious philosophy.13 
 This now leads to the appearance of a new motif that resonates through future letters: 
the idea that some forms of philosophical activity are less useful (that is, less serious) than 
others. In particular, at this stage, Seneca is very concerned that Lucilius should not spend too 
much time on dialectic. Letter 45 is the first extended warning against sophistical niceties. In 
a rhetorical question which will come to have to have some significance for us, Seneca asks 
what point there is in making verbal distinctions, when all they do is to help one avoid the 
traps of dialecticians one does not need to be talking to in the first place. In real life, he says, 
‘it is things that mislead: draw your distinctions between them’: res fallunt: illas discerne 
(45.6). 
 Lucilius clearly does not get the point straight away. The very next letter finds Seneca 
full of praise for a book Lucilius has written. But on closer inspection, this praise turns out to 
be very back-handed. It is Lucilius’ style that Seneca praises – precisely his verbal facility: 
the book, he says, might have been written by Epicurus himself (!) (46.1). As to content: we 
never learn so much as its general topic. When Seneca says that the beauty of the work 
unsettled his judgement so that he has to defer serious comment to another occasion (46.3), 
we are surely meant to hear in this an echo of Socrates’ reaction to the speech of Lysias in the 
Phaedrus (234D-235A).14 Lucilius, it seems, has indeed become hooked on philosophy, but 
with the tyro’s sense of it as something linked to brilliant verbal facility. Seneca pointedly 
shoots off some more letters to him against sophistry (Letters 48, 49), and, in the final letter 
of Book 5, against using philosophy as a way of showing off (52). And all of this, it seems to 
me, is crucial background to Letter 58 in the Book that follows: for Letter 58 is a striking 
foray into just the sort of dialectical niceties Seneca has been warning us about. 
 
 
4. Letter 58 
 
Letter 58 is, by all traditional accounts, a real headache, and no-one has ever really given a 
satisfactory account of the contradictions and unclarities it contains. A description of its 
contents is enough to show the problem.  
 The discussion which takes up most of the letter was inspired, Seneca claims, by 
someone’s comment that Plato recognised ‘six ways in which being is said’ (sex modis hoc 
[sc. quod est] a Platone dici: 58.8), but the letter begins with a lengthy reflection on the Latin 
language. Seneca deplores its ‘poverty’ (paupertas: 1), a poverty exacerbated by the fact that 
more words keep falling out of use (a few are listed at 2-5). With this in mind, he craves his 
readers’ indulgence for adopting new expressions: in particular, the Ciceronian coinage 
essentia as a translation of the Greek οὐσία (‘essence’: 6),15 and the phrase quod est to render 
τὸ ὄν (‘being’: 7-8). It is at this point that Plato’s claim about the senses of ‘being’ is 
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 I disagree, then, with Henderson 2004: 30 that Epicurus echoes beyond this point in any constructive sense: 
he is, I think, definitively left behind. 
14
 If this is right, then Seneca’s remark at 46.3 (tamquam audierim illa, non legerim) would be rather arch: 
Socrates, of course, literally heard (but did not read) Lysias’ speech. 
15
 At least, Seneca claims it is Ciceronian (58.6): Quintilian ascribes it to a ‘Plautus’ (Inst. Or. 2.14.2; 3.6.23) or 
to Verginius Flavus (8.3.33). 
  
introduced; but as a preliminary to its discussion, Seneca explains what it means to classify 
the contents of the world into ‘genera’ and ‘species’ – apparently relying on the Stoic 
definition of those terms (8-15; cf. D.L. 7.61). At 58.16, he finally ‘returns’ (revertor) to 
Plato, setting out the six ‘ways’ (sc. of being) into which things can be divided. These are: 
universals (16); god (17); ideae (sc. ἰδέαι) (18-19); idos (sc. εἶδος) (20); individuals (‘such as 
men, cattle, things,’ as he says) (22); and ‘quasi-beings’ (quae quasi sunt: exemplified by 
void and time) (22). The letter ends with the claim that, after all, none of this fine-grained 
work (subtilitas) is of much profit; but we can use it as the occasion to reflect on the transient 
nature of corporeal entities, including, of course, ourselves (22-37). 
 The exegetical problems here are legion; but perhaps nothing is more problematic 
than the very aspect of the letter which leads readers to see in it an attempt at bringing 
Stoicism and Platonism closer together – namely, the juxtaposition of a more or less Stoic 
classification of beings, according to genus and species (8-15) with a more or less Platonic 
analysis of being (modes of existence) in 16-22. Not to dwell on problems internal to each 
(well exposed in existing literature on this letter), 16  it is unclear that combination or 
convergence between them ought to be possible at all. For the two activities (‘Stoic’ 
classification and ‘Platonic’ analysis) belong to different intellectual spheres: one (the 
classification of things) comes under the terms of ancient dialectic; the other, in dealing with 
the nature of being as such, is properly metaphysics.17 
 Inwood (2007a, 123) is on the whole very forgiving here: Seneca, he says, is merely 
‘insensitive to the philosophical possibilities in a careful distinction between an account of 
how we talk about the world and an account of how the world is.’ That might be more 
surprising than it sounds, however, for this distinction had become a very hot topic in the 
philosophical circles of Seneca’s day, where a lively debate was under way over just which 
of these two sorts of account was to be found in Aristotle’s Categories. (The Stoic Cornutus, 
who might well have been personally known to Seneca, and was certainly in his 
philosophical ambit, was one of the contributors to this debate.)18 And in any case, it makes 
it, if anything, even harder to understand what is going on in this letter if we are to suppose 
that Seneca was not observing this distinction. For it is no minor or peripheral issue that is at 
stake: the topic of the letter itself hangs on the question. If Seneca was unclear what sort of 
account he was giving, then the topic of the letter is unclear. In that case, anyone who thought 
that they understood what the letter was about would in fact be labouring under a delusion: 
they would be as confused as Seneca himself appears to be.  
 But then maybe, after all, that is that is precisely the point. Could Seneca’s 
‘insensitivity’ be deliberate? Could he have set us a trap? At second glance, there are some 
strong indications that not all is as it seems with this letter. 
 Consider the introduction. As my summary above indicates, it is set up to deal – and 
at some length – with the difficulties of translating technical Greek vocabulary into Latin. 
The pretext for it all is to justify Seneca’s use of essentia for the Greek οὐσία. But here is a 
remarkable thing: for all this preliminary agonising, Seneca doesn’t go on to use the word at 
all.19 Again, Seneca worries about translating τὸ ὄν as quod est. The problem this time (he 
says) is that he’ll be using a verb (verbum) for a noun (vocabulum). But why is this a 
                                                 
16
 See n.2 above. 
17
 The confusion arises not only in the juxtaposition: it also exists within the ‘Platonic’ analysis, where a 
classificatory term (‘universal’) is listed alongside types of entity (god, forms, men, and time). 
18
 Cornutus was on the side of those who saw the work as a work of linguistic classification. See Moraux 1984: 
592-601 (and cf. Sedley 2005: 139), with Porphyry, On the Categories iv.1, 58.30 - 59.14; 86.20-4 Busse; 
Simplicius, On the Categories viii. 18.26 – 19.1; 62.24-30 Kalbfleisch. 
19
 This is not simply an oversight, for at 58.6-7 he says that he might not: that to be allowed to do so is all that 
he wants (fortasse contentus ero mihi licere). 
  
problem? Seneca never tells us, and I am yet to find the commentator who can do it for him. 
Add to the mix the curious preamble on the archaic words for ‘gad-fly’, ‘decide’, and ‘order’ 
(2-5, all exemplified from Virgil), and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Seneca is 
engaged here in precisely the sort of distracting and ultimately pointless linguistic speculation 
he elsewhere castigates: the obsession with verba prisca aut ficta . . et translationes inprobas 
of Letter 108.35, for example.20 
 Why would Seneca do this? Precisely, perhaps, to try to avoid the impression that the 
confusion of logic and metaphysics at the heart of the letter is merely ‘muddled’ (compare 
Inwood 2007a, 120, on the division in 58.13-15) or ‘insensitive’. It is much worse than that: 
it is, and it is meant to be, a hopeless mess; but it is a mess with a very particular aetiology. It 
is the sort of mess which is generated when one spends too long worrying about distinctions 
of meaning and not enough time on differences between things. And this is a moral that is all 
the clearer since the mess itself involves confusing distinctions of meanings (the Platonic 
analysis of ‘being’) with distinctions of things (Stoic classification). Letter 58, in other 
words, is an object-lesson for someone who has not yet fully appreciated the message of 
Letter 45: res fallunt: illas discerne. 
 If this is right, then Plato is severely implicated. It was a Platonic linguistic reflection 
– that ‘being is said in six ways’ – that started everything off; and it is in the division that 
Seneca ascribes to Plato that the confusion has its root. For the division ascribed to Plato at 
58.16 is precisely not a linguistic division (about how being is ‘said’) but a metaphysical one, 
concerning the types of being there are. If one further reflects that we should expect Seneca, 
as a Stoic materialist, to be out of sympathy with the existence of at least three of the items 
on Plato’s list of beings – namely forms, whether transcendent (ideai ) or immanent (eidê), 
and god (at least on the transcendent, ‘Platonic’ notion of god presumably intended here) – 
then there is an obvious conclusion to draw from this: that Plato’s inflated ontology is the 
unfortunate result of his dialectical preoccupations. The suggestion would be that Plato got so 
carried away by his work on logical division, in particular in distinguishing senses of ‘being’, 
that he ended up confusedly supposing that some of those senses corresponded to real types 
of entity. Platonic metaphysics on this view turns out to be a monstrous hypostasisation of 
what the Stoics correctly recognised to be merely classificatory categories. 
 This way of reading Letter 58 has some uncomfortable consequences. Most 
importantly, it suggests that the letter is far from being the reliable witness to the 
classificatory theory of the Hellenistic Stoa that it has sometimes been taken to be.21 If I am 
right, it would, on the contrary, be at best a highly refracted version of that theory – distorted 
to the extent that it presumably has little of independent value to offer in our reconstruction 
of the theory. But whatever the extrinsic fall-out, it is a reading which yields, I believe, not 
only a more interesting and relevant conclusion for the letter itself, but also a substantially 
more comprehensive explanation of its peculiarities than any that tries to make Seneca’s 
engagement with Plato more straightforward. If it is objected that it succeeds in this only by 
making the letter excessively devious, the answer is that it is no more devious than Seneca’s 
standard pedagogical approach demands: it is ‘devious’ just as the praise of Lucilius’ book in 
Letter 46 is devious; as devious as the early appropriation of Epicurus, or the suggestion then 
that philosophy is a restful alternative to work. Lucilius by Letter 58 is well past his 
Epicurean phase: his philosophical childhood, so to speak. But we know that he is now, in his 
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 Another – complementary – way of reading this introduction is as a skit on conventional apologies for Latin 
philosophical writing, with their acknowledgement of the supposed ‘poverty’ of the language, and regret for the 
coinages into which their authors will be driven. (Lucretius 1.136-9 is a famous example; cf. Cicero de finibus 
1.1-12; discussion in Fögen 2000.) Seneca’s Latin is not only impoverished but getting poorer as more words 
are lost. 
21
 E.g. Brunschwig 1988; Mansfeld 1992: 78-109; Caston 1999. 
  
philosophical adolescence, attracted to (or, rather, distracted by) the dangers of sophistical 
show. This, I am proposing, is represented for Seneca by Plato. And just as Seneca was 
careful not to be overtly dismissive or explicitly critical of Epicurus at the beginning – on the 
contrary, he exploits convergence with the Stoics – so he treads carefully in Letter 58 with 
Plato. The letter offers Lucilius a logico-metaphysical feast with no overt disapproval. The 
lesson will come when he finds of his own accord, after a bit of chewing, that nothing in this 
will nourish or satisfy.22 It is by these means that Seneca initially helps Lucilius through his 
‘Platonic’ phase. But just as Seneca put Epicurus decisively behind him in Book 4 of the 
Letters, so, I suggest, the critical stance of Letter 65 marks the end of Seneca’s patience with 
Platonism. 
 
 
5. Letter 65 
 
Letter 65 is concerned with the issue of causality, and contrasts the Stoic view with views 
Seneca ascribes to Aristotle and Plato. It is presented as an exposition of the three positions, 
between which Lucilius is invited to judge – although Seneca obviously thinks the Stoics are 
right to admit just one cause, namely god. Aristotle by contrast is said to recognise three 
causes (65.4) – or perhaps four (65.5), or even five (65.14). Plato for his part recognises five 
(65.7) – or should that be six (65.14)? The number of causes keeps growing because the point 
is that the sort of multiplicatio causarum in which Aristotle and Plato are engaged has no 
non-arbitrary limit.23 But the extra ‘causes’ they name are not properly causes at all – they are 
conditions: ‘that in whose absence nothing can be effected’ (65.11). Having made his point, 
Seneca ends once again by raising the question of whether this kind of speculation has any 
value (65.15). What it does, however, is to give the philosopher occasion to consider the 
intellect as something unfettered by the body. As such, it helps him to set the values of body 
and soul into proportion. 
 The traditional view of 65 is that it represents an interest on Seneca’s part in the 
Timaeus – or some imagined Platonist commentary or handbook that dealt with the Timaeus. 
This view is largely based on the fact that Seneca, in the course of his discussion, quotes from 
the Timaeus (65.10, translating 29D-E), which must in fact have been the principal focus of 
contemporary interest in Plato. In recent work, though, Brad Inwood (2007a and b) has 
pointed out that there is much more going on in this letter. In particular, he has drawn 
attention to the important role played by the Phaedo. The letter ends, for example – and, as 
Inwood points out (2007b, 152), the ‘ending’ in this case is some 40% of the whole – with a 
reflection on psychology and ethics whose dualistic language clearly invokes the Phaedo. 
The Phaedo also contributes to its themes of causality and cosmology; and it provides the 
ultimate reference-point for the crucial distinction invoked by Seneca between the ‘causes’ of 
something and the ‘conditions’ for their operation. This distinction, between causes and 
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 Seneca is able to use the material as the occasion for useful reflection, namely on the transience of the 
corporeal (58.25-end). But in doing so, he is explicitly turning away from the substance of the letter up to this 
point as mere ‘amusements’ (oblectamenta: 25). For the discussions of change in Marcus Aurelius see p.XX of 
Bénatouïl’s chapter. 
23
 I see a joke here, comparable with the ever-growing number of rogues supposed to have attacked Falstaff at 
Henry IV pt 1 (II.iv). Inwood suggests that there is an artful ‘casualness’, meant to recreate the atmosphere of 
conversation (2007b: 158; though at 2007a: 144 and 2007b: 162 he sees satire in the introduction of the sixth 
cause): but I note only that the ‘casualness’ is all in one direction – towards more causes, never fewer, even 
though this involves Seneca discussing Aristotle first so that he can talk about Plato ‘adding’ extra causes 
(65.7). Other discussions of the issue address themselves mainly to the initial attribution of three (rather than 
four) causes to Aristotle: see variously Donini (1979), 297-8; Timpanaro (1979); Guida (1981). 
  
conditions, is precisely the distinction that Plato had invoked in the Phaedo to demolish 
Anaxagoras’ attempt to explain the cosmos (99B).  
 So far, so good; but I diverge from Inwood in his conclusion that Letter 65 shows a 
kind of looseness and variety in its sources and topics that is meant to recreate the loose but 
learned style of live conversation (2007b, 165-6). It seems to me, on the contrary, that the 
Phaedo has a privileged relationship with 65 as the source of its very architecture – and, if so, 
then as the key to its real, polemical purpose. In the Appendix to this chapter, I tabulate the 
structural and thematic parallels between Letter 65 and the Phaedo that make this case. The 
following are the main points: 
 
(i) Letter 65 begins with Seneca saying that he had the previous day been ill and incapable of 
doing anything else in the morning; then he attempted a little reading, then he wrote a bit; 
then received a visit from some friends, with whom he turned to conversation. Illness is a 
framing theme of the Phaedo too: it is one of the distractions from intellectual activity that 
Socrates identifies (66B-D: it ‘leaves us no leisure for philosophy’), and Socrates may be 
representing himself as at least metaphorically ill in his deathbed vow of a cock to 
Asclepius.24 In any case, Socrates certainly resembles Seneca in finding himself trapped 
indoors at the beginning of the dialogue. And what has been doing? Not something we hear 
of him doing very much: he has been writing (61B: versifications of Aesop). But now he is 
receiving a visit from friends, with whom he turns to conversation (58D, 63D). 
 
(ii) The transition to the main discussion in Seneca is made with the comment: te arbitrum 
addiximus (65.2). Meanwhile Socrates, in the Phaedo, represents the discussion he is about to 
have as a defence of his lack of fear in the face of death, in front of an audience who will, for 
the duration of the argument, be his jurors (Phd. 63E).  
 
(iii) The bulk of Seneca’s letter discusses the matter of causality, and defends against Plato 
and Aristotle the Stoic hypothesis that the cosmos (as such) has a single cause. The Phaedo 
for its part proceeds with three, related, discussions. The immortality of the soul (which has 
no direct parallel in Seneca) is only one: a second (95-105) is the nature of causality and the 
need for forms in particular, while cosmology makes a third (107-15). These last two 
correspond to Seneca’s interest in applying the issue of causality to an explanation of the 
cosmos. 
 
(iv) Lucilius’ judgement is demanded by Seneca on the matter of causes (65.10, 15), just 
where Socrates’ audience is reminded by him that they are his jury on the matter of the soul 
(69E). Note by the way how Seneca asks for Lucilius to judge which position seems most 
likely.25 In this curious modesty (curious because Seneca seems quite clear what the right 
answer is, and in fact has not even attempted to set out the other side of his question) there is 
a parallel that can be drawn with the Phaedo. For Socrates concludes from his account of the 
cosmos in the Phaedo that, while he could not be sure, he thinks he has given something like 
the right account (namely about souls and their dwellings: 114D). 
 
(iv) Finally, while Socrates takes a bath, drinks the hemlock, and dies, Seneca ends his letter 
with a discussion of the metaphorical way in which philosophy frees the soul from the body – 
and in doing so annihilates the fear of death. 
                                                 
24
 Not to mention the fact that the Phaedo starts with the illness (and absence) of its own author: 59B. 
25
 Reading verisimillimum with the majority of MSS. The parallel is weakened, but does not entirely disappear, 
if one reads the alternative verissimum (‘most true’), since Seneca is here in any case drawing an explicit 
contrast between what merely seems most true or likely, and the truth itself – which is, he says, beyond us. 
  
 
If I am right that all this amounts to a case for seeing the Phaedo as programmatic for Letter 
65, the importance of the observation lies in the fact that it tends to make the existence of 
forms as causes the real point of the letter, not just one topic among others. We might be 
inclined to miss this because we tend to think of the Phaedo as a work that is most 
importantly about the immortality of the soul. But ancient readers also recognised the Phaedo 
as a locus classicus for the discussion of forms as causes.26 In this sense, Seneca can quite 
legitimately take Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras to be the real and focal point of the whole 
exercise. The Phaedo motivates a theory of forms (namely as causes) on the back of Plato’s 
attack on Anaxagoras for appealing to ‘air and aether and water and many other extraordinary 
things’ as cosmological causes (98C) – a move which, Plato says, shows us that Anaxagoras 
could not distinguish between a ‘cause’ and ‘that without which the cause would not be a 
cause’ (ἄλλο µέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν piοτ' εἴη 
αἴτιον: 99B). What Letter 65 does is to reverse the criticism, to say that the Platonic and 
Aristotelian theories of causality owe their unduly and unrestrictedly expansive nature to 
their confusion of ‘that in whose absence nothing can be effected’ with a real cause (65.11). 
The forms which Plato introduced as the solution in his attack on Anaxagoras become here 
the principal object of Seneca’s attack on Plato. 
 Is it likely that Seneca would have gone to this much trouble over Plato’s 
metaphysics? Nothing more likely, in my view. Not only does it round off the series of 
warnings to Lucilius about the dangers of sophistry by exposing (explicitly, this time) the 
metaphysical absurdities to which it gives rise in Plato – thereby signally the end of Seneca’s 
tolerance for Lucilius’ flirtation with this sort of thing –, it also tackles directly what must 
from the beginning have been the Platonist line against the Stoics. Platonists argued that the 
Stoics were in effect deficient heirs of philosophy as Plato left it, in particular insofar as they 
fail to recognise the metaphysical principles which exist prior to the material cosmos. For this 
(so they said) limits the explanatory power of Stoicism, no explanation being complete 
without reference to the divine mind and the pre-existing paradigms for creation which are its 
thoughts; and it limits the credibility of its epistemology too, for knowledge is likewise 
impossible if it is not grounded on ideal, normative principles which lie beyond and before 
the empirical world.27 The Stoics had better have had a response to this – and the response 
they needed is exactly the sort of thing I have ascribed here to Seneca. Forms are fantasies: 
the ontological epigones of sophistical dialectic. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Seneca, I have argued, manifests an unqualified opposition to Platonic metaphysics in Letters 
58 and 65, and it is a stance that defines his response to the Platonist movement which, 
emerging in his day, differentiated itself from Stoicism principally by its commitment to this 
metaphysics. (The attack is, in this sense, a total attack on Platonism as a movement, not a 
quibble over details.) But, as I noted in the Introduction, Seneca also allows it to determine 
his philosophical opposition to Plato. His argument might have been that Platonists were 
                                                 
26
 According to Damascius, for example, ‘Plato has nowhere shown the answer to the question of participation 
[sc. in forms] so clearly’ (in Phd. I. 418, ad 100d). It is in the Phaedo, after all, that Socrates talks of having 
wanted to learn ‘the causes of each thing: why each comes to be and passes away, and why it is’ (96A). He is 
interested specifically in the nature of the highest cause, and it is, as Proclus too knows, in the Phaedo that we 
can an argument for this, or at least an argued rejection of alternatives, not just a description of it (in Tim. i. 
2.11-15, 204.3-8 Diehl). 
27
 For case studies which argue these points, see Boys-Stones 2005 (epistemology) and 2007 (physics).  
  
wrong, that they misunderstood what Plato actually meant. But it was not. As far as Seneca is 
concerned, the Platonists were quite right about Plato – and so much the worse for Plato. And 
in this retreat from the pro-Plato tendencies of the late Hellenistic Stoa,28 Seneca is consistent 
with all our evidence for post-Hellenistic Stoicism.29 
 As I said in the Introduction, part of the reason for this hardening in attitude towards 
Plato may lie in the fact that the new Platonist movement forced Stoics in search of a 
response to revisit the arguments of their school fathers, and in doing so to rediscover the 
anti-Platonic strain of the early Stoa.30 Some further observations relevant to the context of 
philosophical debate in the first century AD might lend additional plausibility to the 
suggestion. The first is the fact that Stoics at this time had an independent motive for 
becoming interested in the founders of their school all over again, in the collapse of the 
formal institution at Athens. There is some evidence that texts of the early Stoics became 
objects of fresh study from the late first century BC – presumably as the obvious reference-
point for the identity of the school in diaspora.31 
 The other observation concerns an aspect of the polemical historiography developed 
by the new Platonists themselves. According to them, the Stoics (and indeed all other post-
Classical schools) fell into error because of innovations they dared to make with respect to 
the perfect system developed by Plato.32 But in these circumstances, it would naturally suit 
the Stoics well to shift the emphasis of their own foundation narrative back to the ultimate 
roots they claimed in Socrates. An argument based on claims of innovation would sound 
weaker against a school that could claim that the essentials of their system were in place 
before Plato was born – and with Plato’s revered teacher to boot. In any case, Seneca’s 
mature preference for Socrates over Plato is clear. It is striking that, in the early Letters, 
Socrates’ appearances were, as often as not, made alongside Plato.33 After Letter 65, Plato is 
mentioned only twice more as a figure in his own right (at 94.38 and 108.38) – with respect, 
to be sure, but not as an authority for anything significant. Socrates, on the other hand, is 
invoked as someone who ‘summoned philosophy as whole back to ethics’, giving the crown 
of wisdom to the ability to distinguish good from bad, rather than to the verbal games played 
by philosophers (71.6-7). As such, he is mentioned in six further letters – and very much, on 
each occasion, as someone who set the example for a true philosophical life.34 
 
 
                                                 
28
 I have in mind, most obviously, Panaetius and Posidonius; but cf. also Antipater (SVF iii. Antipater fr. 56). 
29
 Boys-Stones 2009 is another case-study of the phenomenon (dealing with Cornutus). A possible exception is 
the mysterious Trypho, ‘Stoic and Platonist’, mentioned at Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 17.3. 
30
 It is possible to exaggerate the heat of this antipathy, but there is plenty of evidence for it. Early Stoics writing 
against Plato include: Zeno (SVF i. 260); Persaeus (SVF i. 435); Chrysippus (SVF ii. 763; iii. 157, 226, 288, 313, 
455). Note that it is Xenophon (not Plato) whose Socratic writings convert Zeno to philosophy (D.L. 7.2). 
Compare p.XX of Long’s introduction above.  
31
 Sedley 1997: 114 says, that ‘no commentary can be shown to have been written on a Stoic text before the 
sixth century AD’. But, as Frede notes (2005, 785 with references to Epictetus diss. 1.17.16-18, and Suda α 
3917, ‘Aristocles of Lampsacus’), we know that there were new editions of the classic texts of Stoicism in the 
late first century BC, and there is suggestive evidence for commentaries written in the first century AD too. It is 
telling that Persius possessed ‘around 700 of Chrysippus’ books’ (something like a complete set), which he left 
to Cornutus; equally so that Cornutus accepted them, though giving away the money that Persius bequeathed to 
him in addition (vita Persii 36-41 Clausen). 
32
 See Boys-Stones 2001, ch. 7. 
33
 See 6.6; 44.3-4; and especially 64.10. There are three early letters in which Socrates is mentioned but not 
Plato: see 7.6, 13.14, 28.2. Somewhere between these two groups might be considered Letter 24, where Plato is 
mentioned (at 6), but merely as the author of the Phaedo – on which, together with the Crito, the reference to 
Socrates at 24.4 already relies. 
34
 See Letters 67.7; 70.9; 71.7, 16-17; 79.14; 98.12; 104.7, 21, 27-8. For a study of references to Plato (and other 
philosophers) in Seneca’s corpus at large, see Tieleman 2007. 
  
Appendix: Seneca, Letter 65 and the Phaedo 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to support my suggestion that Letter 65 is a Stoic response to 
the Phaedo in particular, by tabulating parallels in structure and thought between them. Note 
that I do not wish, in arguing this case, to deny that there are important secondary references 
to other dialogues – the Timaeus prominent among them.35 (Seneca actually quotes from the 
Timaeus at 65.10, after all.) But these references, I suggest, can all be considered precisely to 
be secondary – that is, to be framed by the primary relationship of the text with the Phaedo. 
(The quotation from the Timaeus, for example, would be explained by the fact, recognised in 
all the later commentaries, that there is a permeability between the discussions of cosmology 
and causes in the Phaedo and the Timaeus, so that a discussion of one typically calls for a 
cross-reference to the other.)36 As some sort of check on the plausibility of the claim that the 
Phaedo has a particularly strong relationship with Letter 65, I have added a column to the 
table listing parallels with the Timaeus as well. Square brackets and italics are used 
throughout to indicate merely suggestive similarities with Seneca (for example in theme) 
rather than closer parallels in thought: it will be noted that they predominate in the Timaeus 
column.  
  
                                                 
35
 And cf. Inwood 2007b, 152 for other possible dialogues in play. 
36
 So e.g. Proclus appeals to the Phaedo discussion of causality and cosmology in his commentary on the 
Timaeus. (For causality, see i. 2, 204; iii. 137 Diehl; for cosmology i.180, 190, 204; iii. 141 Diehl.) Damascius 
conversely appeals to the cosmology of the Timaeus in his commentary on the Phaedo (i. 503-11 Westerink).  
  
Seneca, Letter 65 Plato, Phaedo Plato, Timaeus 
Opening scene 
- Seneca ill and at first incapable; 
 
- then attempted reading;  
- then wrote a bit (1);  
- then received & conversed with friends (2) 
- [illness of Plato: 59B / for illness preventing 
philosophy: 66C-D] 
 
- Socrates had been writing (61B) 
- then received & conversed with friends (58D, 
63D) 
- [illness and absence of one would-be 
participant: 17A] 
 
 
- [discussion with friends: 17A-B] 
Introduction to the main discussion 
‘Conversation took the place of writing, and 
I am going to set out for you the contentious 
part of it. I appoint you judge’ (2) 
‘With you as my jurors, I wish to give my 
defence for thinking that a man who has really 
devoted his life to philosophy might reasonably 
be cheerful in the face of death . . .’ (63E) 
‘If we provide likelihoods no worse than 
any others, we should be happy, 
remembering that I, who am speaking, 
and you who are my judges, are only 
human’ (29C-D) 
Main discussion(s) 
  
immortality of the soul (64A–95A) 
 
 
 
 
 
On cosmology (including causation, and 
creation of immortal soul) (27D–61C) 
 
 
(Λέγωµεν δὴ δι' ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ 
piᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, 
ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς piερὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέpiοτε 
ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος: 29D-E) 
On causality . . .  on causality (95E–105C) 
 immortality of the soul (105C–107B) 
. . . and its application to cosmology (2-14) 
(Plato ait: ‘quae deo faciendi mundum fuit 
causa? bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam 
boni invidia est.’ fecit itaque quam optimum 
potuit: 10)  
cosmology (107C–115A) 
‘If Plato and Aristotle judge, as a cause of 
something’s being made, that in whose 
absence nothing can be effected (si 
quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id 
causam iudicant esse faciendi), the causes 
they list are too few’ (11). 
‘It is one thing to be a cause of being, another 
to that without which the cause would never 
have been a cause’ (ἄλλο µέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον 
τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ 
ἄν piοτ' εἴη αἴτιον) (99B) 
[cf. συναίτια at 46C-D; συµµεταίτια at 
46E – both ‘accompanying’ causes 
embraced by Plato ] 
closing observation 
‘So bring your sentence as judge, and 
pronounce who you think has the most 
likely position – not who speaks most truly, 
for that is as far above us as the truth itself’ 
(10) 
 
‘It would not befit an intelligent man to insist 
that things are as I have related them; but for 
someone who think that this, or something like 
it, is true of souls and their dwellings, given 
that souls are clearly immortal, the position is 
reasonable and worth venturing . . .’ (114D) 
[compare again 29D, as above, for the 
sentiment] 
coda 
Philosophy wins the metaphorical freedom 
of the soul from the body,  
and freedom from fear of death. (15 – end) 
Socrates dies . . . 
 
. . . calm in death (115B-end) 
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